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THE RECEPTION OF HIGHLY DEVELOPED LEGAL
SYSTEMS BY PEOPLES OF DIFFERENT CULTURES
ERNST LEVY*

This article was presented as a paper by the author to the Con-

ference on Law and the Humanities convened by the American
Council of Learned Societies at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington,

D. C., on April 12 and 13, 1950.

T

HE RECEPTION of legal ideas of one people by another is a universal
phenomenon in world history Wherever the civilization of a tribe
or nation reaches a stage enabling it to build up a legal system, the
conditions of a reception are at hand. The march of ideas, legal as
well as cultural, often follows in the path of material goods. Already
the Code of Hammurabi of about 1750 B.C., which long was held to
be the oldest code of mankind, displays strong Sumerian influences
along with the native Semitic elements. Receptions permeate the
following thousands of years; they have been at work to the present
day The tendency toward and urge for reception are even growing.
As the world has become smaller and every civilized country is more
sensitive to political, economc, and cultural happenings in foreign
lands, so, in the province of law, do institutions and devices spread
far beyond the boundaries of neighboring nations. Moreover, modern
processes of constitutional legislation are apt to make intentional
receptions more easily accomplished. In the nineteenth century there
was almost no codification of the private law that did not show a
decisive influence of the Code Napoleon. And in the twentieth century
a leading, though not quite comparable role fell to the German and
Swiss Civil Codes. Japan and Brazil, Turkey and Mexico, China and
Greece, and even the Soviet Union furnish the evidence. Today a
comparison of legal institutions and techniques is indispensable to
any project of codification, and comparison, in turn, opens the door
toward reception.
The universality of occurrences of reception, however, is by no
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means to be understood as identity or similarity As products of mdividual historical developments they are as varied and colorful as
history itself. Neither in their premises nor in their effects do they
have a common denominator. The only fact in common has been that
the adopted law was available in writing. But that does not mean
that it had to be statutory law It might equally be "juristic law,"
laid down either unofficially in private expositions (authoritative
treatises on the law) or officially in reported decisions (case law).
For the latter the diffusion of the English common law in the United
States and nearly all English-speaking areas provides the prominent
illustration, for the former, the influences of the medieval Sachsenspzegel (Saxon Mirror) in Germany and beyond is notable. Only so
much is true that case laws and code laws exercised a different power
of attraction on reception-minded nations. Where such a nation had
its free choice between a system embodied in a code and one speaking
through thousands of cases, it was likely to prefer the first, as a matter
of expedience. This is why, e.g., in the last hundred years the civil
law as a subject of reception qualified so much better than the common law
Otherwise the history of receptions displays a wealth of varieties.
The initiative may move from either outside or inside the adopting
people. A conqueror may impose his law upon the conquered. A colonizing nation may bring its system and make it prevail, with or
without resistance on the part of the natives. Where, on the other
hand, a country receives a foreign law of its own free will, it may
either proceed by a positive act of legislation or in legal practice
through the activities of bench and bar. In the latter instance, the
process of penetration may take decades or longer. It may even happen
that the people or its lawyers are not aware of the fact that it is
foreign thought they apply; they take its authority for granted. Such
a situation, however, would not easily occur where the adopting
people possessed a satisfactory legal system. The prospects are still
smaller where there is a legal profession firmly established and eager
to defend its interests, which normally are closely tied up with the
given order.
These statements are primarily true of total receptions in which a
people adopts the private law of another as a whole and not only in
regard to a set of rules. The distinction of wholesale and piecemeal
receptions is in common use, and rightly so. It is an entirely different
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thing whether a country in introducing or amending a group of specific provisions has a foreign model in und or transforms its whole
system after that model. When, e.g., our own law with respect to
workmen's compensation or in some statutes adopting the principle
of comparative negligence took lessons from the Continent, these
measures did not affect the innate character of the American system.
Such partial receptions have been remarkably frequent. They are
going on continuously A new type, both significant and promsing,
has recently made its appearance. Under the auspices of the League
of Nations, an International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law was founded in Rome. In 1935, it published drafts on the international sale of goods and the civil liability of innkeepers which
naturally were based on various systems of law in force. Uniform
laws on an international scale were expected to result, but political
tension and the war prevented them. Another draft, however, has
indeed been put on the statute books of most European countries.
I refer to the Uniform Law on Bills of Exchange and Checks as
drawn up at Geneva in 1930 and 1931. While part of their provisions
are original in character, the great majority constitutes a collective
reception, as we may call it, of hitherto national laws. The chief
model was the German regulation which, during the nineteenth century, had won many adherents, but French law also made contributions.
Totally diverse is the aspect where the whole body of the private
law is at stake. All European nations, at one time or another, came
to face the fascinating power of Roman law Should they adopt it or
not? Roughly speaking, England in the thirteenth century answered
in the negative, Germany in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in
the affirmative. Also the recent reception of the Swiss law by Turkey
was total rather than partial in character. And yet we must be
careful not to overdo this antithesis. There is no mathematically
strict dividing line. The boundaries between a far-reaching partial
reception and a limited full reception are often fluid. There were, to
be sure, total receptions in the almost exact meaning of the term:
the code accepted by the Rhineland and the archduchy of Baden
after the Napoleonic conquest was, in fact, essentially a translation
of the French civil code. The codes of Belgium and Italy were not
much more independent. But even in such extreme cases qualifications are not wanting. Moreover, the interpretation in the receiving
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country takes its own course, so that what at the outset was identical
gradually ceases to be it.
Regularly, however, a total reception is total only in a greater or
lesser degree. A reception in complexu, to begin with, does not exist,
where the burden of proof is on the party to a lawsuit who insists on
a foreign system as established by custom. But even an undisputed
reception is sometimes merely subsidiary, i.e., filling the gaps left by
native customary jurisprudence, as it happened, if only in principle,
with the reception of Roman law in Germany More frequently, mixed
formations emerged, especially in the sense that some areas of private
law, as the law of contracts and of personal property, were strongly
affected by the reception, while others, as the law of domestic relations and of real property, maintained a preponderance of the native
law It is this juxtaposition and interaction of native and foreign
elements which I wish to illustrate with a far-reaching event, vzz.,
that reception of the Roman law which took place when for the first
time Germanic states arose on Roman soil.
Their earliest codifications are particularly impressive because, m
legal history, they mark the end of antiquity and the beginning of
the Middle Ages in Western civilization, and, at the same time, they
signify the first clash between the Roman and the Germanic worlds.
The movement started from the Visigoths after they had conquered
southern France and all Spain. About 475, their king Euric issued a
code which, as time went on, wielded great influence on many other
groups, on Burgundians, Bavarians, Alemanni, and also the most
successful and original among those peoples, 'the Lombards and the
Franks. Each of these legislations showed a different blend of Roman
and Germanic elements, and the general tendency was that with the
gradual growth and increasing maturity of Germanic ideas the Roman
element shrank and thus the reception receded. I shall therefore deal
primarily with the law of the Visigoths and, in particular, with the
period preceding their contact with the Corpus Juris of Justinian
(529-534)
In regard to formal characteristics the code of Euric certainly
shows traits of a total reception. Roman, to start with, was the very
idea of and incentive to a codification. Roman was the language, the
conceptual structure, the techniques, the composition of certain fact
patterns, the organization of the material, the whole legislative style.
The professional draftsmen, certainly Roman by descent like many
higher officers of the royal court, were familiar with the prormnent
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sources of the age, and these sources, of course, were Roman. Since
Gothic custom, if ever reduced to writing, was not likely to be accurately defined in the Gothic tongue, it could not be the subject of a
learned study or of such a work as the ruler of the Goths, ambitious
if uncultivated, was striving to attain.
These conditions which formed a background basically favorable
to reception were greatly supported by economic factors such as
developed early in the fifth century, when the Visigoths definitely
settled in France. The division of every single estate between the
Goth assigned to it and the Roman possessor implied the recognition
of individual ownership in land and opened the door to large areas
of the Roman law of property The close neighborly relation thus
created between the two populations entailed the use of Roman coinage: a money economy replaced the natural economy of the earlier
Goths; the Roman law of sales, loans, and interest became accessible
and inviting. Through the same channel the use of writing made its
entrance; writing consequently came to play a principal part in major
legal transactions whether designed to transfer rights or produce
obligations. Moreover, the share in the land allotted to a Goth included
his share in the slaves belonging to the Roman possessor. And even
before this partition, the victorious push of the Visigoths across
Europe from the Black Sea to Spain had immensely added to the
originally small number of slaves in their hands. Slaves were now
prominently active in the households, in agriculture and commerce, in
manual work and higher services, in war and peace, exactly as they
had been among the conquered Romans. No wonder, then, that the
elaborate body of rules the Romans had worked out to regulate the
position of slaves and their qualification to do business offered much
attraction to the victor.
Hence, on the part of the Goths, a great many factors combined to
prepare the ground for a reception. But in those times, Roman law,
too, had gone through an evolution. It is more than doubtful whether
Roman law would have given the Goths a chance if they had entered
the scene 200 or 250 years earlier. The then flourishing classical
jurisprudence was too complicated and required too high a level of
legal training to impress men who lacked adequate legal minds. From
the early fourth century, however, this great system came to disintegrate. A different Roman law began to unfold which, unconcerned
with the traditional niceties, was governed by social and economic
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rather than legal considerations, a law averse to strict concepts and
neither able nor inclined to live up to the standards of classical jurisprudence with respect to artistic elaboration or logical construction.
It is this "vulgar law" which the Germanic tribes were to face. Its
rules were not beyond their understanding; it seemed to appeal to
their curiosity and ambition. An amalgamation of the vulgar law and
Germanic customs was the result, a consequence of lasting importance.
As medieval culture, m general, rested on ancient ideas in that pattern
which the outgoing antiquity had shaped, so did the Roman elements
in early Germanic legal thought appear in the form they had received
after the peak of their development was passed. It was to take many
more centuries before the world at large experienced the influence of
classical Greek culture and before the legal world found access to
classical Roman jurisprudence.
Three significant examples may elucidate this situation. In classical
Roman law a sale was solely a contract to sell. The seller agreed to
transfer the land or the article sold; the buyer agreed to pay the
price. It follows that neither transfer nor payment was part of the
sale. These effects were attained rather by separate transactions
designed to perform what in the contract of sale had merely been
promised. Hence, failure to transfer title or to pay the price could
plainly not affect the validity and binding force of the contract. To
the vulgar law, however, a sale was simply an exchange of price and
goods, a simultaneous act implying both transfer and payment. Such
a cash sale was the normal type familiar to practically every people
who had not yet arrived at a higher standard of legal analysis. It
was no doubt well known to the Visigoths too. But they were inexperienced in formulating general rules. These they found in contemporary Roman law Accordingly, they considered payment as the
backbone and conditio sine qua non of a sale. Payment had to be
proved by documents or witnesses. Absence of payment, even if the
parties assumed it was made, frustrated the sale. If, on the other
hand, the stated price was paid, the transaction could not be attacked
by the allegation that the goods were sold below value. In consequence,
the legislator barred sales on credit, subject to a single qualification
likewise borrowed from the vulgar law If the price was paid in part,
it would save the contract from being voided, and the buyer, if in
default of the rest, would only have to pay interest, unless the vendor
was granted a right of rescission under the terms of the sale. But such
a part payment had to be a substantial one. A mere giving of earnest
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money was not enough. Consent and payment were sufficient to
transfer title. Conveyance or delivery did not constitute an independent requisite. In lieu of delivery a vendor who could not obviously
be relied upon might be requested to furmsh a surety and thereby
validate the contract.
Likewise shaped upon the model of the vulgar law were the basic
concepts underlying the law of property The classical jurists conceived dommium (ownership) as the right of, in principle, total
mastery over a thing, a right exclusively vested in the owner. So they
contrasted dommitum (1) with possessw, the mere actual control, and
(2) with tura in re aliena, limited rights in another man's property,
such as a servitus (easement) or a ususfructus, the right to take the
fruits without impairing the substance. The vulgar law, however,
failed to maintain this lucid structure. Neither possesszo nor dornrnum
remained limited to their former meanings, and the notion of zura -n
re aliena disappeared completely A more popular pattern took its
turn. Possessio, while continuing to connote factual holding, came
also to be the common denominator of any right sn re. It might indicate unqualified ownership, it might refer to a usufructuary or a perpetual lessee: what particular right it meant to indicate was either
stated in clarifying clauses or left to the context to tell. Nor were
dorininum and ususfructus any longer carefully kept apart. Both were
held to be types of ownership, and the difference, comparable with
our distinction of estates in fee-simple and for life, lay solely in scope
and duration. Moreover, a variety of real rights evolved, fuller than
usufruct, but narrower than ownership in their classical senses. A
donation might not, as usual, entitle the donee to sell the gift or to
leave it to others except in certain cases. Veterans, e.g., could transfer
conquered land, awarded them by the emperor, only to men who
would equally enter the service for the defense of the frontier, a case
evidently heralding feudal developments. The Germanic tribes adopted
and expanded all these approaches of the vulgar law The fact that
they thus managed with possession or ownership where Roman law,
both earlier and later, differentiated various sura n re aliena, has
commonly been looked upon as a Germanic trait. But it may be
validly doubted, whether the Germanic draftsmen would have started
there, if they had found the discrimnation of domimum and fura fn
re aliena in the vulgar law Its absence is not only accounted for by
the youthfulness of Germanic thought, but at least in the same degree
motivated by the decadence of Roman legal techniques.
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Again it is not the classical but the vulgar law that furnished the
pattern for the rules concerning a mother's estate that moved to her
children (bona materna) Formerly the children subject to the power
of their father could not own property Anything they acquired went
straight to the father, and he as the sole owner might dispose of it
at will. He maintained these rights until he died, regardless of the
age of the children. From the fourth century, however, this typically
Roman paternal power disintegrated under the impact of popular
custom. Consequently, the title went to the children. The father
could administer the property and take its fruits, but he could no
longer sell or otherwise dispose of it. Nor did his position continue
through his lifetime. He had to pass the whole estate to the children
in case of his remarriage; he must hand over half of their portion
when they were twenty years of age, and two-thirds if they were
emancipated, .e., released from the father's power by legal transaction. This was the state of imperial legislation as the Visigoths
found it. They copied all with the one truly Germanic qualification
that an emancipation would occur tpso jure when the child married.
In regard to a number of broad maxims the borrowing of the Visigoths is particularly obvious. Euric's Code included rules such as
these: An immoral or unlawful transaction shall be void. A sale or
gift made under violence or threat shall be invalid. A debtor in default
shall pay interest on his debt. Property which is the subject of a
pending lawsuit shall not be sold or given to another person. No pnmitive people has, on its own account, ever arrived at such generalizations. They signify the end of a development, not its beginnings. In
fact, those rules were worked out and gradually refined at a time
when the Goths had not even entered their historic age. They were
a work of Roman jurisprudence.
In the instances hitherto discussed the Visigoths followed the lead
of the vulgar law with virtually no qualifications. In other places they
contributed elements of their own. The law of wills and succession
offers a pertinent example. Germanic peoples originally did not know
of the unilateral and revocable declaration of a person designed to
arrange for his succession. Only where he left no members of his
household or sib, he might, in a publicly performed act, create a successor by a kind of adoption. Later he might also proceed by way of
a gift: either he transferred title in his property while reserving the
usufruct for his lifetime, or he retained the ownership with the trans-

RECEPTION OF HIGHLY DEVELOPED LEGAL SYSTEMS

241

fer not becoming effective until his death. In neither way could he
withdraw at discretion. the donation was a contract. This was the
situation when Euric intervened. He made the latter type of donation
revocable, because, as he stated in so many words, it resembled a
testament. But this reception of the Roman testament did not carry
very far. Deviating from it, the Visigothic will did not necessarily
cover the whole estate; it could be limited to a specifically determined
piece of property In other words, testate and intestate succession
became compatible, and the basic difference between the institution
of an heir and a mere bequest was dropped. Nor, as in Roman law,
did the will of the deceased rule supreme, slightly restricted by statutory benefits of the next of km. Only in sporadic instances could the
Visigothic testator dispose freely, as the widow in regard to property
given her by her late husband. Otherwise he was bound by rights in
expectancy vested in his children and other direct descendants. Equally
different from Roman law was the legal order of succession which
called descendants first, ascendants second, and collaterals third;
different the remaining though greatly relaxed discrimination against
females of equal degree of relationship, different the unlike treatment
of real and personal property as parts of the estate. Only minor segments in this order of succession showed Roman characteristics: the
right of grandchildren to enter in the place of their predeceased father
or mother, the succession by the spouse in the absence of relatives
within the seventh degree, and the succession of the church to clerics
who failed to leave such close relatives.
Thus, if in the law of succession Roman and Germanic elements
combined, the matrimonial regime of property displayed a definite
preponderance of Germanic thought. In Roman law, classical as well
as vulgar, marriage as such did not produce any changes with respect
to title or management of the wife's goods; a dos (dowry), if it was
given, went from the bride's side to the husband, who became its
owner. Among the Goths, however, it was up to the bridegroom to
give the dos in order to win the bride, and this transaction, accordingly, was indispensable for a legal marriage. Moreover, most of the
property acquired during marriage constituted a common fund managed by the husband. The conception of such a common property was
nothing new to Germanic peoples, who shaped it in various devices,
while advanced Roman law, more individualistic in character and
averse to any haziness in legal relations, displayed a definite disinclination against joint rights and liabilities.
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The Visigothic law of a daughter's marriage had a remarkable
origin. There was a reception, to be sure, but one of a very peculiar
nature. An enactment issued by the Roman emperor at Ravenna m
422 provided that a betrothal made by the father was binding upon
his minor daughter, even after his death. The West Roman Interpretation construed this enactment as including also a major daughter.
The whole rule ran counter to Roman law, where a girl could not be
married without her consent and, moreover, the betrothal as a mere
promise to marry was not directly binding. The rule of Ravenna
complied fully, however, with Germanic custom, which held a betrothal indispensable to marriage and definitely binding, to the extent
that subsequent marriage to another man was punished as adultery
Besides, the party to the betrothal on the bride's side was her father,
representing her sib, while her consent was legally not required, even
after his death. These old observances underlie the Gothic provisions,
but at the same time the decree of Ravenna appears to have been
drawn upon. Thus an instructive development comes to light. The
Visigoths drew upon a Roman decree which, in turn, took advantage
of a Germanic custom. The Germanic custom, shaped in Roman dress,
returned to its source. We may term that a rereception. And there are
more indications of Germanic custom. Under Roman law, classical
and vulgar, marriage required consent not only of the girl but also of
the father in whose power she stood. To the Visigoths his approval
though normal, was not indispensable. If, not betrothed by him, she
entered a marriage of her own volition, she forfeited her right of
succession, but the marriage held good.
Roman, on the other hand, was the dinment impediment of incest
and, essentially, the law of divorce: its nonjudicial forms, its grounds,
the right of divorce vested in either spouse and the consequences of
an unlawful separation which not only entailed losses m property
but also barred the party separating without legal cause from remarriage. All these traits can be gathered from imperial decrees
released in the fourth and fifth centuries. Pagan Germanic custom,
apart from divorce by mutual agreement, knew only of the right of
the husband to repudiate the wife for certain reasons. At this point
the influence of the Church made itself felt.
In conclusion, let me summarize what a discussion of the relation
between law and culture may gain from a survey on receptions. And
let me concentrate on those peaceful and spontaneous receptions
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which, in the course of history, have been of a far greater consequence
than forcible impositions of a foreign system.
1. To begin with a cultural minimum, we noted that a law is not
capable of a total reception unless it appears in a written form, though
not necessarily in the form of statutes or m the same language.
2. A disparity in cultural levels or a vacuum in elaborate legal concepts on the part of the less civilized people is no bar to reception.
3. Where a reception through legal practice rather than legislation
is in question, the gap between the intellectual or social standards of
the two nations must not be too wide. The Germanic tribes in the
early Middle Ages adopted, if anything, the vulgar and not the classical Roman law Italy, France, and Germany in the high and late
Middle Ages accepted, if anything, Justinian's law not in the fashion
in which he had laid it down, but modified by canon and feudal
institutions and developed by the Italian commentators of the tlnrteenth and fourteenth centuries.
4. Nor must a movement toward reception meet too potent countercurrents or handicaps. A well-organized profession determined to keep
to its traditional law may counteract the invasion of foreign legal
thinking, as did the English bench and bar in the thirteenth century
For the same reason and in view of the numerous differences of
approach in the Common Law and the Civil Law it would hardly be
safe to assume that far-reaching amalgamations or assimilations may
be achieved in the near future. The recent failure to arrive at an
agreement in the case of bills and notes in spite of much good will on
both sides serves as a caution.
5. A people of some indigenous cultural tradition would not indiscriminately accept a foreign law sn toto. It would maintain institutions of its own, and the result would be a blend of native and
foreign elements. Early Roman law, e.g., received some devices on
legislative techmques from the Greeks, preclassical law learned from
them the art of making theoretical distinctions and setting up a system
of legal principles. But whatever was borrowed, whether in method
or substance, was organically adapted, so that something new and
national Roman emerged. Centuries later a similar process on a
broader scale occurred in reverse. In the eastern part of the empire
many institutions were Romanized only to uphold certain features
of their indigenous Hellenistic structure.
6. Not all the parts of a system are to the same extent amenable

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

to reception. Least inclined to give up its traditional feature is the
law of the family including the rules on intestate succession. Second
in order is the law of real property, especially as far as rural land is
concerned. On the other hand, more loosely connected with a people's
past and therefore more easily copied is the law of personal property,
notably that of commercial goods, and consequently most of the law
of contracts. These fungible provinces of the law, which are controlled
by economic interests rather than national customs and sentiments
have at all times offered the readiest seed ground for a reception.
7 If, on this background, we attempt to single out particular factors
making for a reception, none seems to be more important than the
urge of a nation to rise to a higher cultural level, to associate itself
with one or another country leading in the field of law When, in a
period of growing prosperity, self-reliance, and ambition, a people
goes through an awakening, when it refuses to lag behind others and
yet realizes that its own legal habits or concepts are not adequate to
meet the needs of the time, it naturally turns to a superior system and
checks upon the experiences had under it. "Superior" in what sense?
It has lately been discussed whether such a superiority is, as a rule,
due to the general authority or esteem enjoyed by a nation or rather
to the inherent value of its legal structure. The question cannot be
answered once and for all. Both criteria are valid, both at times overlapped or blended. When in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
Germany adopted the Roman law, it mattered greatly that Roman
law was the law of the tmpersum Romanum which seemed to have
been renewed in the German empire and whose idea survived in the
culture of Europe. But the qualities of Roman law likewise played a
considerable part. The artistic composition of an admirably consistent
system won out over the largely uncoordinated mass of rules of
Germanic origin. Again, although in a lesser degree, the triumphal
march of the Code Napoleon in the nineteenth century certainly
owed much to the reputation and brilliance of French culture. Of an
even greater attraction, however, was the lucid style and modern spirit
of the Code itself.
To go further, in many instances it has been the intrinsic superiority alone that counted. Were it not for this factor, the alternative
between Roman codification and English custom could hardly have
arisen in the thirteenth century, and Bracton, the greatest exponent'
of English jurisprudence at that time, would not have been prompted
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to fit English conditions into a Roman frame. His French contemporary Beaumanoir in compiling the customs of his county followed
the same line. Roman law, while lacking authority in northern France,
materially affected Beaumanoir's statements, because it provided him
with the tools to put legal thought into writing. The impression of
Roman legal wisdom was in all these cases so tremendous that adverse
substantive traits were overlooked or disregarded. A Christian world
accepted a system whose outstanding authors had been pagans. A
feudal economy and later the incipient capitalism adapted rules of a
slave economy A social order largely built on wealth in real property
made use of a codification which with its urban character paid little
attention to the distinction between land and movables. A society
accustomed to treat human beings as members of associations, whether
a village community or a craft guild, turned to a law in which the
individual constituted the normal unit and relations between individuals formed the backbone of legal discussion. The explanation is
supplied by the fact that the arsenal of Roman rules was rich and
flexible enough to allow for selection and interpretation which made
them adjustable to the needs of new times.
Passing to our own age, the contrast between authority and quality
as factors of reception seems to have faded to the vanishing point.
There appears to be no prestige involved except the one which is
based on a superior .quality of the adopted system. In the 1920's, 30's,
and 40's, Soviet Russia, Mexico, China, and Greece enacted civil
codes. They all drew heavily on the German code, although German
power after the defeat in 1918 and German reputation under the
Hitler regime were at a low ebb, indeed. What counted was only the
excellence of the code. It was the more modern background, the
consistent structure, the precise terminology, the clarity of legal concepts that made the German code stand out and in part prevail over
the French. Most of these virtues are qualities in point of form rather
than substance. And this is no coincidence. The problem whether one
system is materially closer to true justice than another often defies
solution. The answer, at any rate, is too difficult to form the basis
for the reception or rejection of a foreign law Even a passionate
champion of the civil law would not easily contend that the preference
it enjoys over the common law as a subject of reception is attributable
to the superior value of its substance as a whole.

